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ABSTRACT: Organizations are more dependent than ever on the reliable operation of 
their information systems, which have become a key to their success and effectiveness. 
While the growing dependence on information systems creates an urgent need to 
collect information and make it accessible, the proliferation of computer technology 
has also spawned opportunities for ill-intentioned individuals to violate the informa-
tion systems' integrity and validity. 
One of the most common control mechanisms for authenticating users of compu-
terized information systems is the use of passwords. However, despite the widespread 
use of passwords, little attention has been given to the characteristics of their actual 
use. This paper addresses the gap in evaluating the characteristics of real-life pass-
words and presents the results of an empirical study on password usage. It investigates 
the core characteristics of user-generated passwords and associations among those 
characteristics. 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: access control, information system security, passwords, 
user authentication. 
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IN NOVEMBER 1988, ROBERT MORRIS, JR., A GRADUATE STUDENT at Cornell Univer-
sity injected an experimental, self-replicating, self-propagating program into the 
Internet. His program, later dubbed the Internet worm, contained a bug that caused it 
to propagate itself far faster than Morris intended. It raced across the network using 
automated password-guessing techniques to penetrate and bring down over 6,200 
computer systems in the United States. While no known alteration or destruction of 
data occurred, the program filled all available memory space on infected computers, 
bringing them to a grinding halt. The cost of clearing memory space and restarting 
systems was estimated at 100 million dollars [ 49, 51]. 
A key element of the Internet worm involved attempts to discover user passwords. 
It exploited the tendency of users to choose easy-to-remember passwords and used 
lists of words, including the standard online dictionary, name lists, and combinations 
of four-digit numbers (standing for the last four digits of a social security number), as 
potential passwords. It compared them against the actual passwords stored in the 
system file and gained access whenever a match was found. 
Because the use of passwords has always been one of the most common control 
mechanisms for authenticating users of computerized information systems, it was 
expected that the Morris incident would have raised the awareness of system users 
about the consequences of how they choose their passwords. However, despite the 
widespread use of passwords and their importance as the first line of defense in most 
information systems, little attention has been given to the characteristics of their actual 
use. This study looks at real-life user-selected passwords to address two research 
questions: 
I. What are the characteristics of user-selected passwords, such as number of 
characters in a password, type of characters used in a password, frequency 
of changing passwords, and the method of choosing passwords? 
2. What are the relationships among key password characteristics, data attri-
butes, and password memorizability. 
The Threat 
ORGANIZATIONS ARE MORE DEPENDENT THAN EVER ON THE RELIABLE OPERATION of 
their information systems (IS), which have become a key to their success. Global 
competitive pressures and continuing innovations are forcing organizations to employ 
information technology to rationalize business processes, increase organizational 
effectiveness and productivity, and help them in gaining competitive advantage [65). 
Consequently, IS has become essential to the welfare and even survival of many 
organizations. In many cases it is impossible to run an organization without proper 
and smooth operation of its information systems. 
While the growing dependence on IS creates an urgent need to collect information 
and render it accessible, the proliferation of computer technology has bred opportunities 
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for ill-intentioned individuals to violate IS integrity and validity. Despite the scarcity 
of reliable information about the amount of computer crime that occurs and the nature 
and severity of the crimes [57], the available evidence suggests significant losses. 
Studies by LaPlante [37] and Ernst & Whinney [22] revealed that more than half of 
U.S. firms suffer major dollar losses annually from computer abuse. A study of 
Fortune 500 companies showed that 61 percent of the reported incidents of computer 
misuse were fraud and embezzlement cases that ranged from several thousands of 
dollars to over one million dollars [21 ]. Hoffer and Straub [30] found that one out of 
five organizations experiences at least one security breach in a three-year period, with 
one organization reporting a two-million-dollar loss. Moreover, since only 5 to 10 
percent of all computer abuse is reported to law enforcement authorities [55], the 
extent of the problem is probably much larger. In addition to financial losses, computer 
crime can result in the loss of data or the disclosure of confidential data to competitors. 
The following examples convey the variety and scope of computer crimes: 
• In the fall of 1978, Stanley Rifkin obtained the electronic transfer code for the 
Security Pacific Bank in Los Angeles. Posing as a branch manager, he used the 
code to transfer $13 million from Security Pacific to his Swiss bank account 
[58]. 
• A group of German hackers penetrated dozens of military, government, and 
commercial computer systems by cracking passwords of legitimate users and 
system administrators. They were looking for military information that could 
be sold to the Soviet Union [53, 54]. 
• In April 1994, an English teenager penetrated Pentagon computers and set off 
a massive security alert when his Internet probing nearly provoked an act of war 
with North Korea. He entered the Department of Defense systems through the 
Air Force's Rome (New York) Laboratory using the default password guest 
[59]. 
• Early in 1998, a trio oflsraeli teenagers hacked into the information systems of 
the Knesset, Israel's parliament. By guessing user passwords, they accessed 150 
accounts. They left the data and system unharmed but sent the system adminis-
trator an e-mail message describing the system's security loopholes [18]. 
• Two California teenagers cracked passwords of several Pentagon computers to 
enter data on the Department of Defense payroll data and personnel files [19]. 
The introduction of Internet-based purchasing and customer service applications, 
along with the successful incorporation of the Internet in many extraorganizational IS 
applications, further enhances their vulnerability and provides evidence that new 
management-directed countermeasures are required to shore up system defenses [7]. 
A fundamental security mechanism in any information system is the ability to 
authenticate the identity of a system user. While research continues on more sophis-
ticated methods of authentication, password mechanisms remain the predominant 
method of authenticating IS users [14, 38, 61, 63, 64]. Even popular encryption 
programs, such as PGP and RSA, rely on access authentication via passwords and pass-
phrases [l, 25, 44]. However, while Morris's Internet worm [49], Stoll's experience 
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[ 54], and the Mitnick affair [23] caused considerable furor in the press and raised many 
troubling issues regarding computer security in general and user authentication in 
particular, password practices seem to be as lax as ever. 
Hacker intrusion has raised user awareness about the consequences oflax security 
practices without addressing the core of the laxity: user password practices. Depen-
dency on global and organizational information systems grows apace without com-
mensurate sophistication in the management of access authentication [8, 14]. 
However, despite the fact that practically every penetration of a computer system, at 
some stage, relies on the ability to compromise a password, little attention has been 
given to the characteristics of their actual use. This paper assesses empirically the 
characteristics of real-life, user-selected passwords and looks at possible associations 
among these characteristics. 
Evolution of Passwords 
CRUCIAL TO ACCESS CONTROL IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POSITIVE, unique identifi-
cation for each person or entity to whom access is to be granted. While there are several 
methods for authenticating the identity ofa user, the most common method requires 
a user to provide information that is supposedly known only to him or her [34, 35, 
64]. 
A user typically logs onto a system and then provides a nominal, claimed identity, 
such as a user-name or an account number. The system then requests a password that 
is a single, mutually agreed-upon code word, assumed to be known only to the user 
and the operating system. In some cases a password is chosen by a user; in other cases, 
it is assigned by the security kernel of the operating system. When entered at log-on, 
a password is checked against the information stored in a password file in the operating 
system; ifthere is a match, the user is granted access to the system [6]. 
Most multiuser computer systems employ user-selected passwords. The advantage 
ofuser-selectcd passwords is that they are easily remembered by users. The disadvan-
tage is that they are often weak. System-assigned passwords are usually stronger than 
user-selected passwords, but generally difficult for users to remember [6, 64 ]. 
The tradeoffbetween memorizability and security poses a dilemma for self-selected 
passwords. Passwords should be difficult to guess and easy to remember. For pass-
words to be difficult to guess, they should be selected from a large domain. However, 
if passwords are chosen to make them difficult to guess, they may also be difficult to 
remember. The most secure type of password is a random string of characters [ 5, 14, 
27, 29]. Although long, random, arbitrary passwords are difficult for others to guess, 
users generally cannot remember them. Thus, most users will take the road of least 
resistance and resort to the minimum number of characters acceptable by their system 
and use meaningful details, such as their name, nickname, initials, or birth date [27, 
28, 39). 
A password that is difficult to remember invites users to write it down, ensuring they 
will not forget it but compromising its secrecy [45]. On the other hand, if a difficult 
password is not written down, it may well be forgotten, resulting in serious inconve-
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nience [I, 3). An organization should establish a password policy that strikes a balance 
between ease of recall and susceptibility to compromise [8]. 
A unique effort to reveal the characteristics of passwords used in a real-life system 
was made by Morris and Thompson [42]. They described the basic characteristics of 
user-generated passwords in a UNIX environment and analyzed the level of security 
provided by these passwords. Examining over three thousand passwords, they noted 
that over 85 percent of them fell into one of the following categories: words in an 
English dictionary, reverse spelling of words in a dictionary, first or last names, street 
names, cities, and social security or telephone numbers. These findings suggest that 
most passwords are easy to guess and fail to provide the required level of security to 
the systems they are supposed to protect. 
Despite the growing importance of passwords as a first line of defense in most 
information systems, no follow-on research or additional empirical work on password 
usage has been reported since the Morris and Thompson study. The literature on 
password methods features lists of do's and don'ts [5, 33]. The "do" list recommends 
passwords that are long, composed of random characters, and frequently changed. The 
"don't" list warns against the use of names, initials, dates, and personal and environ-
mental cues. 
Key Issues and Exploration Hypotheses 
To ADDRESS THE MOST PROMINENT PASSWORD USAGE CONCERNS of management, this 
study focused on two research questions: (I) What are the characteristics of user-selected 
passwords, and (2) what are the relationships among key password characteristics? 
The first question focuses on the actual implementation of real-life passwords. 
Password characteristics under investigation are length (number of characters in a 
password), composition (character domain: alphabetic, numeric, alphanumeric, or the 
entire ASCII character set), lifetime (frequency of changing passwords), and password 
selection method. Selection method means whether a password is based on a person-
ally meaningful detail (user's last name, first name, nickname, child's name, or some 
other easily recalled bit of personal, biographical information), a combination of 
meaningful details (BILL89 or LOVEMARY), a pronounceable string of characters 
(2BFREE), string of random characters (H*DGFH8H), or some other basis [2, 14, 20, 
28, 29, 34, 60, 64]. 
The second question focuses on possible relationships among data attributes, key 
password variables, and password memorability. Of specific interest are associations 
between data attributes and password characteristics, password characteristics and 
their memoraizbility, and computer usage pattern and password memorizability. 
Figure I summarizes the key variables and associations tested. 
Our first hypothesis refers to possible associations between data importance and 
sensitivity and password characteristics. Data importance refers to the inherent value 
of the data to an individual user. Sensitivity means the degree to which problems would 
arise ifthe contents of their data files were known to others. To distinguish between 
importance and sensitivity of a data file, consider, for example, a data file containing 
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Figure I. Key Issues in Password Security 
Memorability 
\ Write-down 
the text of this research paper. It might not be publicly sensitive but it would be of 
major value to its authors. By comparison, a professor's data file containing student 
course grades would have little inherent value but would be highly sensitive to 
disclosure. In the United States, divulging such a list could violate laws regarding 
privacy of information. 
Previous research reveals little about the possible associations between data attri-
butes and password characteristics. Highland [29] and Hoffman [31] suggested that 
the level of security should be commensurate with the importance of the resources it 
protects, but this relationship has not been investigated empirically. This research will 
test if data attributes, such as data importance and sensitivity, affect certain character-
istics of user-generated passwords. 
H 1: Password characteristics (length, composition, lifetime, and selection 
method) are associated with the importance and sensitivity of the data being 
protected. 
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The next set of hypotheses investigates possible relationships between password 
characteristics and their memorizability and the tendency to write down passwords. It 
has been suggested that password characteristics affect memorizability [2, 3, 28, 45, 
46]. It follows that, if a password is difficult to remember, it will be written down [3, 
27, 28, 64]. Empirical evidence for such relationships is sought through the following 
hypotheses: 
H2: Password characteristics (length, composition, lifetime, and selection 
method) are associated with difficulty in remembering the password. 
H3: Password characteristics (length, composition, lifetime, and selection 
method) are associated with writing the password down. 
H4: The difficulty of remembering a password is associated with writing the 
password down. 
A third issue to be explored is whether password memorizability or the tendency to 
write down a password is related to frequency of use. Menkus [39] assumes that 
frequent use of a password enhances memorizability and reduces the need to write it 
down. Similar assertions are made by Ahituv et al. [2], Barton and Barton [5], and 
Morrey [ 41 ]. The following hypothesis addresses these relationships: 
H5: The difficulty of remembering a password or writing it down is associated 
with the frequency with which it is used. 
Methodology 
Instrumentation 
DATA FOR THIS STUDY WERE COLLECTED BY MEANS OF A QUESTIONNAIRE that asked 
for responses in five areas: user demographics, data attributes, computer usage pattern, 
password characteristics, and password memorizability. Demographic items included 
age, sex, and organizational affiliation. Data attributes were addressed in two ques-
tions that separately targeted the importance and the sensitivity of a user's data files 
using a five-point, Likert-type scale. Data importance referred to the inherent value 
of the data to an individual user, and the scale ranged from "nonvital" (1) to "highly 
vital" (5). For example, if the data were lost, what would be the impact on a 
respondent's ability to do his or her job? Sensitivity means the degree to which 
problems would arise if the contents of data files were known to others. The scale 
ranged from "nonsensitive" ( 1) to "highly sensitive" (5). For example, if the data were 
made public, what would be the impact on a respondent's organization? Data impor-
tance and data sensitivity are characteristics of the data only insofar as they are 
expressed through each user's attitudes about the data within the context of his or her 
organization. 
To assess computer usage patterns, respondents were asked how often they used 
their password. The ordinal scale ranged from "never" to "several times a day." 
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Password characteristics involve length (number of characters in password), compo-
sition (multiple-choice option: alphabetic, numeric, alphanumeric, or the entire ASCII 
character set), lifetime (ordinal scale, ranging from "never" to "more than once a 
month''), and selection method (a meaningful detail, a combination of meaningful 
details, pronounceable, random combination of characters, or other). Selection method 
means whether a password is based on (a) a personally meaningful detail, such as 
user's last name, first name, nickname, child's name, (b) a combination of meaningful 
details (BILL89 or LOVEMARY), (c) a pronounceable string of characters 
(2BFREE), (d) a string of random characters (H*DGFH8H), or (e) some other basis 
that the respondent was asked to specify [2, 20, 28, 34, 60]. 
The fifth area, password memorizability and write-down practice, entails diffi-
culty in remembering a password (yes or no), if the password was written down 
(yes or no), and, if so, where (wallet, notebook, calendar, desk, drawer, keyboard, 
monitor, etc.). 
Instrument Validation 
Before the questionnaire was administered, it was tested for validity and reliability 
[12, 16, 32, 56]. Content validity of the items was established through a literature 
review on user authentication in general and passwords in particular. This was used 
as a starting point for determining the central and tangential dimensions of the 
construct. As the first stage of a prestudy, a draft form of the questionnaire was 
presented to eight IS security experts who monitor and manage password practices, 
and to twelve users. We were thereby able to better interpret particular questions and 
assess the clarity and completeness of the questionnaire. As a result, we added one 
new item to the questionnaire and modified three others. The revised questionnaire 
was approved by the prestudy panel. 
In the second prestudy stage, thirty-six randomly selected users were asked to judge 
the questionnaire. Specifically, we divided these users into two groups of eighteen 
individuals. The subject matter and the dimensions of the questionnaire were ex-
plained to the members of the first group who were then interviewed and asked to 
evaluate the items for their applicability to the respective dimensions of the question-
naire. The questionnaire was administered to the same individuals one month later 
[15]. The results of the interviews and corresponding questionnaire responses were 
then matched (correlation= 0.93, p < 0.001). Matching of the second group's two 
response waves yielded a correlation of 0.90 (p < 0.00 I). The matching results of the 
combined group also reveal a statistically significant correlation (r = 0.92, p < 0.00 I). 
A third prestudy stage assessed the test-retest reliability of the instrument. The 
questionnaire was administered on two occasions separated by a six-week interval to 
a sample of eighty-nine randomly selected users. The correlation for this repetition of 
the overall instrument was r = 0.88 (p < 0.001 ). Test-retest correlations for individual 
items ranged from r = 0.64 to r = 0.96 (p < 0.00 I for all). 
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Source of the Data 
The source of the data for this study was computer users at a Department of Defense 
(DoD) installation in California. Most employees at this installation have access to 
one or more of the computing center facilities within the installation. These facilities 
can be accessed using a combination of a user ID (assigned by the computing center) 
and a user-generated password. Once authenticated and granted access, a user has 
immediate access to a variety of computing resources within the DoD through the 
attached communications network, as well as access to the Internet. 
Sample Characteristics 
The questionnaires were distributed through the internal mail system to two 
thousand computer users at this installation. Nine hundred and ninety-seven 
questionnaires (49.9 percent) were returned. Seven hundred and three of the 
respondents were men and 294 were women. The average age of the respondents 
was thirty-four; the range was from twenty-three to seventy-six. Of these, 860 (43 
percent) used passwords and were included in the analysis. Because asking users 
about their password practices is a sensitive topic, we treated responses as anon-
ymous. This, of course, deprived us of any opportunity to follow up on non-
respondents and introduced bias into the findings of our study. However, we are 
not claiming that the findings here statistically represent any larger population. 
This is a case study of system users in one government organization at one time. 
We would speculate that our findings are probably not atypical of user practices 
and shortcomings at other places and times, but we cannot substantiate such an 
assertion. 
Descriptive Findings: Password Characteristics 
Password Length 
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHARACTERS w AS SIX. Figure 2 shows that passwords of 
five and six characters nearly tied in popularity, and 80 percent of the respondents said 
they used four to seven characters in their passwords. While passwords are recom-
mended to be, at minimum, six characters in length (13, 20, 27, 47] and the ideal length 
is thought to be six to eight characters (39], 47 percent of the surveyed respondents 
failed to create a password that long. Windows NT and Unix support passwords up to 
fifteen characters long [36, 62], while the password length in RSA is up to thirty-two 
characters [ 1]. 
Morris and Thompson [42] suggest that a shorter password means less work for an 
intruder in a brute force attack to discover a user's password. Their view is based on 
search complexity and is supported in the literature [3, 34, 47]. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170 MOSHE ZVIRAN AND WILLIAM J. HAGA 
24.9% 
24% 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ 
Number of Characters in Password 
Password Composition 
As depicted in figure 3, 80.1 percent of the respondents claimed to prefer alpha-
betic characters for their passwords, while only 0. 7 percent said they used the 
entire ASCII character set as a basis for their password. This finding lends further 
support to Morris and Thompson's [42] study and suggests that, despite the large 
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Alphabetic Numeric Alphanumeric ASCII 
Structure of Password Characteristics 
Figure 3. Password Composition 
variety of characters available to users, they tend to avoid nonalphanumeric symbols 
in their passwords. 
Password Change Frequency 
The periodic changing ofa password is a basic security measure [20, 34, 41]. Wood 
[60] asserts that passwords should be changed annually . Menkus [39] suggests every 
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Frequency of Password Changes 
Figure 4. Frequency of Password Changes 
thirty days. While research supports the frequent changing of passwords to reduce 
predictability, this study found that 79.6 percent of the surveyed users said they never 
changed their password (figure 4). Less than 5.5 percent of them said they changed 
their passwords more often than once a year. 
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Password Selection Method 
Password compromises have resulted from information on computer bulletin boards, 
guesses about meaningful details about a user, environmental cues, and systematic 
intrusions [5, 14, 29, 42, 49]. Examples of meaningful details are names, nicknames, 
name of child, name of pet, name of spouse or relations, slang, profanity, car names, 
or birth dates. The item has meaning for the person using it, which should enhance its 
memorizability. However, selecting meaningful details as passwords increased "the 
hackers' comfort" [26], since it limits the number of guesses a penetrator has to make 
[35]. Figure 5 shows that users have a strong preference (78.4 percent) for passwords 
made up from a meaningful detail or a combination of meaningful details. 
Password Memorizability and Write-Down 
When a user writes down a password, he or she usually does so in an insecure location 
[ 14, 52]. Once a password is written down, it is no longer something to be guessed but 
becomes something to be located [48). Consequently, searching through a user's 
notebook, desk, diary, or user's manual will usually reveal a password [3]. 
The DoD Password Management Guidelines recommend that "If passwords must 
be written, they should be protected in a manner that is consistent with the damage 
that could be caused by their compromise" [20]. While only 9.7 percent of the 
respondents reported difficulty remembering their password, 35.3 percent of them said 
they wrote down their passwords. The popular location of choice was the wallet ( 42.1 
percent), followed by a notebook (21.3 percent), calendar or organizer ( 16.6 percent), 
and desk/keyboard/monitor (7.6 percent). 
Relationships Between Password Characteristics 
SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR EACH OF THE HYPOTHESES that follow 
depends on the nature of the particular variables being tested [50). By convention, in 
reporting empirical findings, associated refers to a relationship between variables that 
does not assert or suggest causality [24, 64). 
Relationship Between Data Attributes and Password Characteristics 
Data importance refers to the inherent value of the data to an individual user. Sensitivity means 
the degree to which problems would arise ifthe contents of data files were known to others. 
We considered that respondents who scored their data as a 4 or 5 on the importance scale 
regarded it as at least "vital." Similarly, respondents who scored their data as a 4 or 5 on the 
sensitivity scale judged it at least "sensitive." While42.5 percent of the respondents considered 
their data to be at least "vital," 49.3 percent judged their data to be at least "sensitive." 
In testing the first hypothesis, we followed Hoffman [3 I] and Highland [28, 29] in 
assuming that data rated as sensitive or important would be surrounded with more 
security than data not so rated. For the sake of presentation, HI was broken down into 
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detail Basis of Choosing Password 
Figure 5. Password Selection Method 
four subhypotheses, each of which refers to a single password characteristic. 
H 1 a: The number of characters in a password is associated with the character-
istics (sensitivity and importance) of the data being protected. 
A null hypothesis of no association between the number of characters in a password 
and either the importance or sensitivity of the data it protects could not be rejected at 
R
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Table I. Associations of Password Characteristics with Data Attributes 
Password Level of 
Hypothesis characteristic Data attribute measure Test 
H1a Length Sensitivity Interval ANOVA 
Importance Interval ANOVA 
H1b Composition Sensitivity Nominal Kruskal-Wallis 
Importance Nominal Kruskal-Wallis 
H1c Lifetime Sensitivity Ordinal Spearman's rho 
Importance Ordinal Spearman's rho 
H1d Selection Sensitivity Nominal Kruskal-Wallis 
Importance Nominal Kruskal-Wallis 
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the 0.05 level of probability that this association could have occurred by chance alone. 
The finding is that no association existed between the length of a password and the 
importance or sensitivity of the data it protected. This finding contradicts the assump-
tion that a user would treat sensitive or important data with care and select a longer 
password, comprised of a variety of alphanumeric and nonalphanumeric symbols. 
H 1 b: The composition of a password is associated with the characteristics 
(sensitivity and importance) of the data being protected. 
A null hypothesis of no association between the composition of a password and 
either the importance or sensitivity of the data it protects could not be rejected at the 
0.05 level of probability that this association could have occurred by chance alone. 
The finding is that no association existed between the composition of a password and 
the importance or sensitivity of the data it protected. 
Hie: The frequency with which a password is changed is associated with the 
characteristics (sensitivity and importance) of the data being protected. 
A null hypothesis of no association between the frequency with which a password is 
changed and either the importance or sensitivity of the data it protects was rejected at the 
0.05 level, suggesting that frequency of changing a password is related to the importance 
or sensitivity of the data it protects. These findings confirm Highland's finding [29] that 
users take care to choose passwords that are difficult to predict and take the precaution of 
frequently changing their passwords in order to protect sensitive or important data. 
H 1 d: The method used to select a password is associated with the characteristics 
(sensitivity and importance) of the data being protected. 
A null hypothesis of no association between the method used to select a password 
and either the importance or sensitivity of the data it protects was rejected at the 0.05 
level. This lack of association between the selection method of a password and the 
importance or sensitivity of the data it protects might be explained by the likelihood 
that, when users choose a password, they are naive about the importance or sensitivity 
of the information they will be storing. Once they grasp the character of the data they 
will be protecting, users may then change their passwords accordingly. 
Relationship Between Password Characteristics and Memorizability 
The second set of hypotheses investigates possible relationships among password 
characteristics, their memorizability, and the tendency to write down passwords. It has 
been suggested that password characteristics affect memorizability [2, 33, 28, 45, 46]. 
Consequently, it follows that ifa password is difficult to remember it will be written 
down [3, 27, 28, 52]. 
H2: The characteristics of a password (number of characters, composition, 
frequency of change, and method of selection) are associated with difficulty in 
remembering it. 
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Table 2. Association of Password Characteristics with Memorizability 
Association between Eassword memorizabili~ and: 
Level of Reject null 
Variable measure Test Test value Probabili!}:'. hypothesis 
Length Interval t-test --0.38 0.706 No 
Composition Nominal Cramer's V 0.1131 0.0110 Yes 
Lifetime Ordinal Mann-Whitney 25363 0.0000 Yes 
Selection Nominal Cramer's V 0.1221 0.0121 Yes 
A null hypothesis of no relationship between the characteristics of a password and 
difficulty remembering it was rejected at the 0.05 level in the case of a password's 
composition, frequency of change, and method of selection. However, the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected in the case of password length. The finding is that a 
password's composition, frequency of change, and method of selection are related to 
how difficult it is to remember, while the number of characters in a password is not 
(Table 2). 
The finding of a connection between password composition and recall supports 
Wood [60], who found that alphanumeric passwords based on a meaningful detail are 
more easily remembered than passwords generated from pseudo-random combina-
tions. Users will select passwords from a simple domain of things meaningful to them 
or something from episodic memory [39, 60]. The number of characters in a password 
was expected to affect memorizability [40]. Barton and Barton [5], Highland [27, 29], 
and Menkus [39] suggest that the ability to recall a password decreases as its length 
increases. It has long been accepted that people can remember expressions of about 
seven characters in length [40]. Menkus [39] has proposed that passwords be in the 
range of six to eight characters. Respondents in this study did not adhere to these 
suggestions. 
H3: The characteristics of a password (number of characters, composition, 
frequency of change, and method of selection) are associated with writing it down. 
A null hypothesis of no relationship between a password's characteristics and 
writing it down could not be rejected at the 0.05 level for password length, frequency 
of change, and selection method. However, the null hypothesis was rejected in the 
case of password composition. The finding is that length, change frequency, and 
selection method are not related to writing down a password, while its composition 
is. The lack of empirical support here for a connection between password length and 
writing it down challenges Avame's [3] suggestion that writing down a password is 
a function of its length (Table 3). 
H4: The difficulty of remembering a password is associated with writing it down. 
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Table 3. Association of Password Characteristics with Writing Down Passwords 
Association between writing down a Eassword and: 
Level of Reject null 
Variable measure Test Test value Probabili!):: hypothesis 
Length Interval t-test --0.20 0.839 No 
Composition Nominal Cramer's V 0.1194 0.0065 Yes 
Lifetime Ordinal Mann-Whitney 65872 0.9899 No 
Selection Nominal Cramer's V 0.0875 0.1584 No 
A null hypothesis of no relationship between difficulty in remembering a password 
and writing it down was rejected at the 0.05 level (x2 == 38.45,p == 0.000). The finding 
is that the difficulty of recalling a password is related to writing it down. These findings 
show that 9. 7 percent of the respondents found it difficult to remember their passwords, 
while 23.3 percent wrote them down. Users who expect that they will not be logging 
into the system frequently may choose to write down their password for future 
reference [27]. Users may write down their password simply out of habit or because 
they anticipate changing their password frequently [2, 3, 39]. 
Relationship Between Frequency of Password 
Usage and Memorizability 
The third issue explored is whether password memorizability or the tendency to write 
down a password are related to the frequency of password use. This issue is addressed 
byH5: 
H5: The difficulty of remembering a password or writing it down is associated 
with the frequency with which it used. 
Using the Mann-Whitney test, the null hypothesis of no relationship between the 
frequency with which a password is used and difficulty in recalling it or writing it 
down was rejected at the 0.05 level. The finding is that usage frequency is related to 
recall difficulty and writing down a password. This finding supports the assumption 
that infrequent use of a password could lead to the password being forgotten and 
prompt a user to write it down, and it supports Spender's [52] suggestion that frequent 
access to an information system is related to password memorizability (2, 41, 52]. 
Discussion 
USER-SELECTED PASSWORDS ARE RELATIVELY WEAK AND EASY TO GUESS, and their 
characteristics in the Internet era have not changed much from those in the pre-personal 
computer era identified by Morris and Thompson [ 42]. Despite efforts by information 
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system professionals to educate users about secure password practices, this study 
found that user-selected passwords are still being made up of the characteristics of 
personal details meaningful to the user, are relative}y short, are comprised of alpha-
numeric characters, are rarely changed, and are usually written down. Passwords 
remain easy to remember and simple in structure. 
While 8.6 percent of the users in this study rated their data files as "nonvital," we 
expected that those who rated them as vital would be careful in choosing and using 
their passwords. This study showed that how a password is chosen, the number of 
characters in a password, and password composition (alphanumeric or ASCII) were 
not affected by the level of data importance or sensitivity. This finding can be 
explained by the fact that most users are asked to devise a password when registering 
as new system users, long before they can know how important or sensitive their data 
files will be. As new users, most likely they lack information system security 
consciousness and discipline. 
It is important, however, that we found that the frequency of changing a password 
is affected by the level of data importance and sensitivity. A user will choose to change 
his or her password more often if he or she is protecting important or sensitive data 
files. 
The analysis of the relationships among the password variables and their 
memorizability and the tendency to write them down yielded both confirmations of 
the conventional wisdom about password practices as well as some surprises. The 
confirmations were: 
I. Password selection methods affect password memorizability. 
2. The frequency of changing a password, although it increases the level of 
security, hinders memorizability. 
3. The more frequently a password is used, the Jess it is written down. 
4. The more a password is used, the less difficult it is to remember. 
5. Frequently changing passwords, necessary to reduce password predictabil-
ity, nonetheless hinders recall. 
6. Difficulty recalling a password is related to a user's tendency to write it 
down. 
The surprises were: 
I. Difficulty recalling a password or writing it down is not related to a 
password's length. 
2. Whether a password was chosen in such a way as to make it easy to 
remember had no bearing on whether or not it was written down. 
Many of the findings reported here are neither confirmations nor surprises because 
they introduce dimensions of password security previously not explored in the 
literature, such as data importance, data sensitivity, and frequency of use. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
MANAGEMENT'S CONCERN WITH INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY has decreased over 
recent years. In 1981, it ranked as the fourteenth most important information manage-
ment topic (4]. In a 1986 study, security was.ranked eighteenth [9], and in a 1989 
survey the issue had dropped to nineteenth place (43]. In a 1995 study (10], MIS 
executives dropped the security issue from their top twenty MIS issues, suggesting that 
either security had become less of an issue or they had implemented greater control. 
The traditional user-selected password is still the common means of authentication 
for users. Endorsed by U.S. Government security agencies, user-selected passwords 
are popular because they are conceptually simple, inexpensive to administer, and 
user-friendly (11]. However, the empirical findings reported here suggest that com-
puter users tend to violate secure password practices, resulting in passwords that are 
easy to guess. 
User-selected passwords are supposed to be long, composed of characters beyond 
alphanumerics, changed frequently, and not based on personal details; however, 
almost 50 percent of the users surveyed in this study reported passwords composed of 
five or fewer characters; 80 percent used only alphabetic characters; 80 percent never 
changed their password; and 78 percent based their password on a combination of 
meaningful details. These findings indicate a need to look at the effectiveness of 
educational efforts to raise the security consciousness of system users. In addition, 
organizations should have a set of guidelines for selecting and implementing 
user-selected passwords and mechanisms that monitor their implementation. 
Another avenue to overcome the problem of selecting easy-to-guess passwords 
is the use of password validation software such as Proactive Password Checker [6] 
for Unix systems, Baseline Software's Password Coach, Computer Oracle and 
Password System, and Crack, a public-domain password tool [ 17]. These programs 
evaluate each user-selected password for its characteristics to ensure that all users employ 
strong passwords. Crack uses its own dictionaries and rules to guess user's passwords. If 
a user fails to select a strong password in a given number of attempts, some systems assign 
a system-generated password that has the required characteristics. Also, in order to 
minimize the risk of systematic password-guessing trials, stricter user-authentication 
strategies, such as "three strikes and you are out" should be employed. 
The details of passwords and their effectiveness warrant further research. First, the 
information systems community enjoys a surfeit of essays and nonempirical insights 
into what users ought to do about password practices. This community will benefit 
from channeling research efforts toward investigations ofhow users actually use their 
passwords. Second, the IS community would be well served if the procedures de-
scribed here were replicated to challenge these findings in various user populations 
and organizations. A third avenue for future research is possible differences in the 
quality of passwords between organizations with a well-defined security policy and 
those without one. Finally, the security impact of using password validation systems 
in a user-generated password environment should be examined. 
The fact that a sixteen-year-old boy in Colindale, England, could unwittingly make 
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it appear that the United States was attempting to access North Korean computers, just 
because the default password guest was all he needed to break into the Pentagon's 
data systems [59], should make it clear that the less9ns about user password practices 
remain to be learned. · 
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APPENDIX: Password Characteristics Questionnaire 
A FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY MECHANISM IN ANY INFORMATION SYSTEM is the ability 
to authenticate the identity of a system user. While research continues on more 
sophisticated methods of authentication, password mechanisms remain the predomi-
nant method of authenticating IS users. However, despite the fact that practically every 
penetration of a computer system at some stage relies on the ability to compromise a 
password, little attention has been given to the characteristics of their actual use. This 
questionnaire is aimed at collecting empirical data to evaluate the characteristics of 
real-life, user-selected passwords and investigating possible associations among these 
characteristics. Please respond to the following questions without revealing your 
password. We thank you for your cooperation. 
1. Do you use the organization's mainframe system or any of its local area 
networks (circle one)? 
No Yes 
If no, please return this questionnaire anyway. Even if you do not use the system, we 
appreciate completed returns to this survey. 
If yes, please continue. 
2. How many characters are in your password? 
3. How did you choose your password (circle one)? 
a. A meaningful detail. (e.g., name, date, street) 
b. A combination of meaningful details. (e.g., Billl997, 4june63) 
c. A pronounceable password. (e.g., one4you, 2Bfree) 
d. A random combination of characters. (e.g., car8&t, dUCk*? +) 
e. Other (please specify) 
4. What are the characteristics of your password (circle one)? 
a. Alphabetic (e.g., abdc, ERTIS). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PASSWORD SECURITY 185 




d. At least once a month. 
e. Several times a month. 
f. At least once a week. 
g. Several times a week. 
h. At least once a day. 
i. Several times a day. 
12. Do you use any other information systems that require the use of a 
password? (circle one) 
No Yes 
13. Do you use the same password on the other systems? (circle one) 
No Yes 
Please place completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided and 
return as soon as possible. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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1 
b. Numeric (e.g., 1234, 5579). 
c. Alphanumeric (e.g., a34d, Fo67YI). 
d. ASCII (e.g. , cd!Yx, Aci+t6). 
5. Have you ever had difficulty remembering your passwords (circle one)? 
No Yes 
6. Very often, computer users find it convenient to write down their password 
for one of those unfortunate times when they forget it. Do you also practice 
this. (circle one)? 
No Yes 
If so, where do you write it down (users manual, calendar book, notebook, 
desk, drawer, keyboard, monitor, on something in your wallet, or other)? 
Where: 
7. How often did/do you change your password (circle one)? 
a. Never. 
b. Less than once a year. 
c. Up to three times a year. 
d. Four to six times a year. 
e. About once every month. 
f. More then once a month. 
8. Have you ever changed your password because you felt it had been guessed 
by someone else (circle one)? 
No Yes 
If so, what Jed you to believe it had been guessed? 
9. Data importance refers to the inherent value of the data to you or to the 




would not miss, 









10. Data sensitivity means the degree to which problems would arise if the 
contents of data files were known to others. If the data were made public, 
what would be the impact on your organization? On a scale of 1 to 5, how 
sensitive are your data (circle one)? 
2 4 
Nonsensitive 








personally or to 
the organization 
